The British Operational Picture
Although weather conditions were far from ideal for a sea-borne assault and had already necessitated a twenty-four hour postponement of D-day, the Supreme Commander decided to launch the operation on the night of 5/6 June 1944. What ever may have been the private thoughts as to the wisdom of this decision by those actually on the landing craft in the heavy swell that was running at the time, there is no doubt that the prevailing conditions led to the assault proving to be an even bigger surprise to the enemy than had been hoped. Resistance was fierce in many localities but was generally less formidable than had been anticipated.
During the night 6 Airborne Division made a successful landing with comparatively light casualties They seized the bridges at BENOUVILLE and RANVILLE intact and thereafter proceeded to establish and hold a limited bridge-head across the river ORNE.
At H-hour the assaulting divisions went ashore on the beaches with 50 Infantry Division on the right, 3 Canadian Division in the centre and 3 British Division on the left. Although the village of LE HAMEL was strongly defended and held out until 1700 hours, 50 Division quickly established a bridgehead and by nightfall had made contact with 3 Canadian Division on the left and were on the high ground EAST of BAYEUX, from VAUX-SUR-AURE T7884 to BRECY T8878.
Despite a considerable amount of mortar and shell fire on the beaches, 3 Canadian Division advanced inland in the centre sector to reach the line CREULLY T9080 BENNY-SUR-MER T9680. On the left 3 British Division captured OUISTREHAM, made contact with 6 Airborne Division on its left and established itself on the line PERRIERS-SUR-LE-DAN U0576-BENOUVILLE U0974.
On 7 June BAYEUX was captured and 30 Corps attempted to advance SOUTH on the axis TILLY-SUR-SEULLES/VILLERS BOCAGE. 7 Armoured Division actually outflanked TILLY-SUR-SEULLES and reached VILLERS BOCAGE but were compelled to withdraw again to the high ground North-West of the town. On the 1 Corps front the enemy had delivered several counter attacks both EAST and WEST of the ORNE without success. In fact EAST of the ORNE our positions were improved by the capture of BREVILLE U1374 on 13 June by 6 Airborne Division reinforced by 51 Division.
From 16 to 30 June operations were directed to the capture of CAEN so that a strong left flank could be provided for the bridgehead. On 19 June 30 Corps finally captured TILLY-SUR-SEULLES after very fierce fighting. Regrouping now took place and 8 Corps came into the centre between 30 and 1 Corps.
On 25 June 30 Corps attacked SOUTH across the road CAUMONT—CAEN and by 27 June after repeated counter attacks and a slight withdrawal had secured a firm hold on the RAURAY feature some three quarters of a mile NORTH of BRETTEVILLETTE T8864.
On the same day 15 Division under 8 Corps had secured a bridgehead over the River ODON NORTH of GAVRUS T9262, while the following day the high ground around Point 112 T9562 was captured by 11 Armoured Division.
On the left of the BRITISH front 51 Division improved the bridgehead over the ORNE by capturing SAINT HONORINE but any move by 3 British Division in the direction of CAEN met with the fiercest resistance.
It was planned that from now on Second Army was to continue to contain the main enemy force and even draw further enemy formations towards it, while the US forces made a wide sweep on the right against what was hoped would be weak opposition.
Second Army therefore had three main tasks:
• to contain the main enemy forces in their present area
• to capture CAEN as soon as possible
• to repulse all counter attacks with its own resources so that the AMERICAN sweep SOUTH and WEST could continue unhampered.
After an attack by 450 heavy bombers of Bomber Command on 7 July, CAEN was finally captured on 9 July. From 10 to 18 July only limited progress was made, but on 18 July a powerful thrust was launched EAST of CAEN preceded by an air bombardment from over two thousand heavy and medium bombers. At the start excellent progress was made by the armour, but after three days heavy fighting a strong anti-tank screen brought the advance to a halt. The CAEN suburbs EAST of the ORNE had been cleared and the advance had reached the general line SAINT MARTIN-DE-FONTENAY U0260—BOURGUEBUS U06—CAGNY U1164.
In order to oppose our attack the enemy had concentrated almost all his armour EAST of the ORNE and Second Army had achieved its object of containing the main enemy forces thus smoothing the way for the US advances.
Administrative Development
Administrative Development
The period from D-day to 25 July saw the support of the armies develop from hastily stacked dumps on the beaches in the first few hours of the operation to the final establishment of the vast and intricate organisation of the Rear Maintenance Area.
The various changes and improvisations that contributed to this result can only be described here in the briefest outline so that a general picture of this development can be obtained.
Division of Assault Area
Division of Assault Area
Both for operational and administrative reasons the BRITISH assault area had been divided up into three beach sectors.
On the right was GOLD Sector on to which 50 Division was to assault as the advance formation of 30 Corps. In the centre was JUNO Sector and on the left SWORD Sector on to which 3 Canadian Division and 3 British Division were to assault respectively, both under the command of 1 Corps.
These Beach sectors were further sub-divided down to beaches called in the case of GOLD Sector and reading from WEST to EAST, ITEM, JIG, KING, in the case of JUNO Sector, LOVE, MIKE, NAN and OBOE and in the case of SWORD Sector, PETER, QUEEN and ROGER.
Yet another sub-division was made in each of these beaches whereby the EAST half of the beach was entitled “GREEN” and the WEST “RED”. Thus the eastern half of KING beach would be known as “KING GREEN”.
For the administration of its beach sector 30 Corps had 104 Beach Sub Area under command under which again were 9 and 10 Beach Groups operating on JIG and KING beaches respectively.
For the JUNO Sector 102 Beach Sub Area with 7 and 8 Beach Groups operating MIKE and NAN beaches was placed under command of 1 Corps, while for SWORD Sector, also under 1 Corps, was 101 Beach Sub Area with 5 and 6 Beach Groups in command of QUEEN and ROGER beaches.
From the dumps to be formed on these beaches, Beach Maintenance Areas were to develop and these were given the code words “SUN” in the GOLD Sector, “STAR” in the JUNO Sector and “MOON” in the SWORD Sector.
From D-day until the establishment of the rear army boundary (which did not take place until 23 July), all the operations in the 21 Army Group area were under command of Second Army.
The general picture is one of heavy fighting along the whole of the BRITISH front with only limited advances being made but, fortunately, just sufficient to give the necessary space for the requisite administrative layout although this was very restricted as compared to the area originally planned.
In addition to these difficulties, the administrative operations in the SWORD Sector on the eastern beaches were further complicated by the fact that the beaches were under observation and fire from the enemy and that the CAEN—OUISTREHAM canal could not be used or cleared owing to the proximity of their forces. The canal lock-gates at OUISTREHAM had, by good fortune, been captured intact but there was constant anxiety as to their safety from enemy artillery fire.
The Beaches
The Beaches
The initial stages of the operation on the BRITISH Sector went according to plan and all the beach sub-areas landed on D-day. There were two main difficulties about the beaches, firstly that the slopes were not steep which meant that except at high water all craft and LSTs had to dry out and secondly that owing to this gentle slope the nearest anchorages for shipping would be some distance off-shore.
Fully laden stores ships for instance would have to drop anchor some five miles from the beach and this imposed considerable delays and difficulties in the turn-round of ferry craft and DUKWs. There was no serious bombing but a gradually increasing number of attacks by E boats and explosive devices were launched particularly against the eastern end of the assault beaches. The work of the beach sub-areas deserves mention as upon their exploits depended the continued existence of the forces ashore.
104 Beach Sub Area under command of 50 Division landed on time despite the bad weather. Opposition on ITEM beach considerably delayed the commencement of the administrative operations across as the beaches as the beach group personnel were busy clearing up a pocket of the enemy and rounding up prisoners until late in the afternoon of D-day.
In order to provide immediate reserves on landing, two initial dump areas were organised immediately behind the beaches into which the pre-loaded vehicles deposited their loads. These dumps were also to be built up from stores loaded in LCT but owing to the weather these did not land as planned and the dump areas had to be built up mainly from stores from the pre-loaded vehicles. Even so they proved invaluable.
The whole of KING beach was planned to be developed by 9 Beach Group and JIG GREEN and ITEM RED beaches by 10 Beach Group. Owing to large patches of peat and soft clay on parts of the beach KING GREEN had to be given up with the exception of making a pontoon causeway for landing personnel and to compensate for this abandonment it was decided to make a hard for LCT on LOVE GREEN beach.
ITEM RED and JIG GREEN beaches were developed as planned. The main depots of the beach maintenance area were not finally ready to receive stores until late on D+2 by which time a considerable quantity of stores had accumulated in the initial dump areas. Once the beach maintenance area depots were established they worked well and no major alterations proved necessary to the pre D-day first key plan.
104 Beach Sub Area also had 36 Beach Brick under command which was provided to replace casualties which were anticipated to be heavy. In actual fact casualties proved negligible and 36 Beach Brick was used as a reserve of labour.
102 Beach Sub Area consisted of 7 and 8 Beach Groups with 4 Beach Group in reserve and had landed under command of 3 Canadian Division slightly behind time owing to the rough weather. It had been planned only to develop the MIKE and NAN beaches, MIKE beach by 7 Beach Group and NAN by 8 Beach Group.
The development of MIKE beach was held up owing to fire from an enemy strong point at VAUX. This strong point was eventually eliminated by an attack by one company from the beach groups supported by tanks on D+2.
The beach maintenance area was laid out in with the first key plan and only minor alterations proved necessary. Owing to bad weather the arrival of four coasters on D-day was delayed until early on D+1 and seven more coasters due to arrive on D+1 did not do so until D+2.
Luckily COURSEULLES was captured virtually undamaged and the utmost use was made of the facilities that this small port provided. Up to 1,000 tons a day were unloaded at this port but the discharge of coasters there proved unsuccessful and was abandoned after D+4.
101 Beach Sub Area landed on QUEEN beach under command 3 British Division, having 5 and 6 Beach Groups under its own command.
5 Beach Group landed with the assault brigade of the Division while 6 Beach Group came in with the follow-up brigade. 5 Beach Group’s role was to command the beaches while 6 Beach Group, having passed through them, was to reconnoitre and control, the maintenance area. In order to meet the maintenance requirements of 3 Division on D-day, four pre-loaded LCTs each containing 200 tons of high priority stores were beached at H+4 hours. These stores were unloaded into sector stores dumps close to the beaches from which the units drew as required.
Unfortunately, owing to minefields the area for these sector stores dumps was very restricted and during the first few days considerable congestion ensued which was increased by the fact that, due to enemy action, the beach maintenance area depots were not ready to accept stores until D+3. It had been planned that maintenance from the sector stores dumps would only last for 24 hours but as the beach maintenance area was not ready to receive stores by the evening of D-day DUKWS and pre-loaded vehicles which should have discharged into the BMA then were switched to the sector stores dumps.
Owing to enemy shelling to the EAST from behind the River ORNE the PETER beaches were gradually developed in the hope that these would be out of accurate gun range. It had been hoped that OUISTREHAM which had been captured on D-day with the locks virtually intact would be operated by 101 Beach Sub Area and would have compensated for the limited capacity of the beaches but this never materialised as the port area was under constant shell fire from enemy positions on the EAST of the CAEN canal.
On D+2 disaster nearly overtook the maintenance build up in this area as a stick of bombs hit one of the four sector stores dumps and 100,000 gallons of petrol and 400 tons of ammunition were lost. A new site was immediately reconnoitred for ammunition and petrol and the latter was brought in on a high priority from a cased petrol carrier lying in the anchorage. In actual fact, enemy interference with the unloading over this sector continued throughout this phase. In spite of the great gallantry and hard work displayed by all ranks which resulted in as high a daily average weight of stores per beach group being brought in as any other beach group achieved in the beach-head, the SWORD beaches were abandoned on 12 July.
The Ports
The Ports
In addition to the unloading over the beaches and at the small ports already mentioned, considerable use was made of PORT EN BESSIN and of MULBERRY B as the latter developed.
In the planning stages it had been considered that PORT EN BESSIN could only be used for shallow draft coasters and would therefore be developed as the bulk petrol port for tankers discharging from within the port and from ship-to-shore lines up to a distance of three miles out.
After its capture on D+1 the port was found to be better than expected and capable of taking tankers up to 14’ draft in the outer harbour. The quays also were relatively undamaged and it was forthwith decided to use it for mixed cargoes in addition to bulk -petrol, and also for heavy lifts unloaded in the GOLD Sector.
The first cargo was unloaded on D+5 although due to various delays imposed by the weather bulk petrol was not discharged until 24 June (D+19). Both BRITISH and US tankers used the port, the BRITISH pipeline being on the EAST of the harbour and the AMERICAN on the WEST. The first ship-to-shore petrol line was opened on 1 July.
Meanwhile, the initial development and construction of MULBERRY B proceeded according to plan. The various tows of floating pier-heads etc arrived from UK without serious incident despite the somewhat unfavourable weather.
Commander 4 L of C Sub Area reconnoitred a transhipment area which proved to be suitable although the approaches to it were difficult owing to the high ground immediately behind the beaches. The first coasters commenced to discharge their loads on 11 June which was four days after work on the port began.
From 19—2-2 June a gale of unprecedented force raged. To a large degree the import of personnel, vehicles and stores ceased as a result of its violence. The delay in the discharge of shipping resulted in a back-log being built up in the UK and convoys had to be stepped back while the time of turn-round of shipping was considerably lengthened over that planned.
But even more important was the damage that was done to the installations of MULBERRY A and MULBERRY B.
The MULBERRY A in the AMERICAN sector was so badly damaged that further work on it was abandoned. Without this decision it would have been impossible to complete MULBERRY B to the scale envisaged owing to the damage it incurred and to the number of component parts which were lost in transit across the Channel. However, the portions salvaged from the AMERICAN MULBERRY and those destined for it were diverted to enable MULBERRY B to be completed to its full scale. Despite this severe set-back the construction proceeded and in actual fact the port achieved its target figure of 4,000 tons per day on 22 June.
Administrative Command and Control
Administrative Command and Control
From D+5 HQ Second Army controlled the beach sub areas through the Corps HQs but as it was obviously desirable that corps should not have to look over their shoulders for longer than was necessary, HQ 11 L of C Area took over the local administration of the beach sub-areas on the same date.
HQ Second Army Troops simultaneously took over command of the depots in the BMAs which were now being expanded into two L of C terminals later called army roadheads. The technical control of the depots, however, remained under the appropriate Services of HQ Second Army.
Meanwhile, 4 L of C Sub Area, under command 11 L of C Area, had assumed the responsibility for the adminstration of MULBERRY B and of PORT EN BESSIN through HQ 10 Garrison.
On the arrival of First Canadian Army it became necessary to establish a coordinating HQ for the administration of the rear areas.
On D+37, assisted by a staff and service increment from HQ 21 Army Group, HQ L of C assumed this responsibility until HQ 21 Army Group took over administrative control in the theatre on D+44.
Also on D+37 the second key plan for the RMA was produced. Throughout this period, and actually until D+46, the armies retained operational control of their respective roadhead depots.
5 L of C Sub Area was made responsible for the local administral it on of the RMA as it developed from No. 2 Army roadhead in the BAYEUX area.
On 23 July the rear army boundaries of Second Army and First Canadian Army became effective.
On 25 July 7 Base Sub Area, originally scheduled to operate the SEINE ports when captured, took over the ports of CAEN and OUISTREHAM relieving 101 Beach Sub Area which had assumed this responsibility on 11 J uly, two days after the capture of CAEN. The latter HQ relieved HQ 10 Garrison at PORT EN BESSIN who were placed under command Second Army for duties in the forward areas.
On the assumption of administrative control on the Continent by HQ 21 Army Group, the RMA was formed from Nos. 1 and 2 Army roadheads which were referred to respectively as RMA EAST and RMA WEST.
First Canadian Army continued to draw from RMA EAST and Second Army from RMA WEST, but 21 Army Group co-ordinated the issues in order to regulate the stocks. Ammunition and ordnance stores in the RMA EAST were gradually to be eaten down as eventually the RMA would be centred around BAYEUX by which time armies would have established new roadheads.
Achievement
Achievement
An illustration of the enormous expansion is the fact that on D-day 59,900 personnel, 8,900 vehicles and 1,900 tons of stores were landed while by D+50 631,000 personnel, 153,000 vehicles and 689,000 tons of stores, in addition to 68,000 tons of bulk POL had been transported into the bridgehead.
Movements Problem
The Movements Problem
Clearly in an amphibious operation of this nature the movements aspect looms very large and in the early stages the principal interest rests on the shipping side. An advanced element of the shipping branch of HQ 21 Army Group was sent over with HQ Second Army. As the latter formation moved forward this element was attached to HQ 11 L of C Area until the arrival of HQ L of C. Initially it was solely concerned with shipping problems but very soon the necessity for central co-ordination of all movement was realised and the element was appropriately increased.
PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES
The conveyance of personnel and vehicles to the Continent was carried out by means of LCT Marks III and IV, LST, MT ships, LS1 and, on D+l and D+2, in large personnel ships transporting over 2,000 personnel each.
It is interesting to note that the only casualty apart from minor damage, was one MT ship which was hit by gun fire when passing through the Straits of DOVER on D+l. Although the Royal Navy was apprehensive of the results, LCT were beached for discharge and as no serious damage ensued this practice continued for a very considerable time.
The discharge of LST had been planned to be by the use of Rhino ferries which were floating rafts of naval pontoon equipment with their own engines and tugs. Owing to rough seas a number of Rhino ferries were lost or damaged en route and therefore insufficient were available to discharge the LST as planned.
The beaching of LST was then resorted to and proved successful. This practice naturally resulted in a larger number of LST having to be repaired, but the advantages gained by the rapid disembarkation of troops and embarkation of casualties for evacuation more than offset this handicap.
Casualty evacuation by LST proved most successful. MT ships were unloaded by their own derricks into LCT Marks V and VI, LCM and Rhino ferries which were then either beached or brought to one of the special causeways for discharge. The first MT ship discharged on D+1. The unloading of personnel ships and LSI presented no serious problem. The first hospital carrier for the evacuation of casualties was brought over on 14 June and after that there was almost always one hospital carrier off the BRITISH beaches.
STORES
The main difficulty in the programming of stores was the continual delay owing to weather and other causes which upset the bids that had been made before the operation began.
Stores discharged tended to be 25 per cent behind schedule throughout the early stages. Due to the storm and other causes there was a serious lack of ferry craft which affected the rate of discharge so barges, pontoons and tugs had to be brought across to increase the resources available.
In general the DUKW proved the most efficient means for the discharge of stores.
The handling of heavy and awkward lifts both in vehicles and stores was an acute problem. CHERBOURG, where it would have been easier, was in no state to receive heavy lifts alongside berths until late in August, so they had to be brought across the beaches.
Non-mobile loads were either placed on tank transporters and then discharged from LCTs or else were stowed. on lighters and unloaded by shore cranes at PORT EN BESSIN or COURSEULLES.
An Express Coaster Service was inaugurated to meet urgent stores demands with the priorities for them controlled by “Q”.
ROADS
Every road in the bridgehead area was used to its fullest capacity, and the main movement problem was making the best utilisation of all the roads available.
RAIL
The limitations of the beach-head reduced the rail problem, but those railway lines that were captured were soon put into working order.
A quantity of stock and a few locomotives, mainly in the BAYEUX area, were utilised and the first train ran on 4 July.
AIR
Dakota aircraft were used for the evacuation of wounded but this was not arranged through Movements channels.
Personnel traffic for the first 30 days was limited to special visits due to the shortage of airfields but a regular service was instituted by SHAEF in mid-July while an Anson service for officers of HQ 21 Army Group began on 20 July.
On 6 July a regular service carrying mail, newspapers, medical stores and a limited quantity of essential items was begun with transport aircraft. "A big air lift was available for emergency use if a unit became isolated but was not employed by the BRITISH during this phase.
Roadheads
Roadheads
During this phase no army roadheads were opened other than Nos. 1 and 2 which later together formed the RMA.
Formations drew their maintenance requirements direct from these roadheads in fires and second line transport as directed by army I-IQ.
As soon as operations and distances from the roadheads warranted it corps opened their own Field Maintenance Centres which were all established by 26 June except in the case of 12 Corps, the last corps to land.
I Corps and 30 Corps were based on 1 and 2 Army roadheads respectively throughout this period, but the other corps were maintained from either roadhead as the operational and administrative situation dictated.
In general 2 Canadian Corps was based on No. 1 Army roadhead which was taken over by First Canadian Army on 23 July while 8 and 12 Corps were maintained from No. 2 Army Roadhead.
In the case of certain items, particularly ammunition, it was often necessary especially in the earlier stages, for corps to draw certain natures from one roadhead while being based on another, due to the stock position; this unfortunately resulted in a certain amount of cross movement which could not be avoided until reasonable reserve stocks had been built up in the roadheads.
Ammunition
Ammunition
It was possible to maintain the force during the attempts to break out of the bridgehead without serious difficulty except in the case of ammunition. It became necessary to restrict the issues of certain natures due to the fact that the stores landing programme was behind schedule chiefly because of the storm and the fact that expenditure of artillery ammunition had been very heavy, as the break-out was not achieved as quickly as had been expected in the planning stage.
Every effort was made to improve the situation by selective discharge of ships and all ammunition ships were given top priority for unloading, the more important types required being 25 pr and 5.5 BL gun ammunition.
It was also agreed with the Navy on 20 June that ammunition ships would be off-loaded within the inner harbour of MULBERRY B although this was regarded as a highly dangerous procedure.
At the same time it was decided to cut the shipments of POL of which good reserves had been built up in order to provide space for artillery ammunition.
Large reserves of tank and AA ammunition had now accumulated, the former because there had been no tank battles as might have been expected had there been a break through and the latter because enemy air attacks were on a far smaller scale than anticipated.
It was therefore found possible to cut 3,600 tons from the ammunition shipping programme for certain tank and AA ammunition and allot this tonnage to field artillery natures.
This, added to the cuts in import of POL and to the extra shipping made available specially for ammunition, increased the normal artillery ammunition shipping programme by 10,000 tons all of which arrived by 27 July and averted the temporary crisis.
Maintenance of Vehicle Strength
Maintenance of Vehicle Strength
In general, replacement of vehicles in NORMANDY worked according to plan. Owing to the small losses in the assault and immediately afterwards, serious consideration was given to the phasing back of the replacement vehicle programme.
It was, however, decided that no substantial alteration would be made to the planned programme and this was found to be a wise decision, because by the time the battle of CAEN was finished all vehicle losses suffered by formations in the early days had been made good. It proved possible to maintain the vehicle strength of all formations then in the bridgehead and a small GHQ reserve stock was also beginning to build up.
The initial reserves of “A” vehicles arrived in the theatre with Corps Delivery Squadrons between D+8 and D+18.
After D+18 “A” vehicles were shipped unaccompanied in bulk to depots in the bridge head, from which they were available for issue to the Armoured Replacement Group organisation.
Small numbers of “B” vehicles were taken into the bridgehead by Corps Ordnance Field Parks until D+18 after which “B” vehicles were also shipped unaccompanied in bulk.
The despatch of replacement vehicles unaccompanied by drivers led to complications, as on occasions due to lack of information about arrivals ordnance drivers were not available to meet the craft carrying them on arrival on the far shore.
In some cases replacement vehicles were driven off the craft by individuals who had never driven before !
Due partly to the anxiety of the Royal Navy to turn round their craft they were forced into the driver’s seat, the engine was started, first gear engaged and they were precipitated into three feet of water—somewhat to the detriment of the vehicles’ condition.
Thus the most careful control had to be exercised over the arrival of replacement vehicles especially as the first Black Market in liberated EUROPE showed signs of starting on the beaches. Units who wanted to “make” a vehicle sent back drivers to meet craft and if the opportunity presented, drove off what they fancied.
General
General
By 25 July the general level of reserves in the theatre had been built up considerably and was more than adequate to support the final successful efforts to break out of the bridgehead.
The 21 Army Group and army depots were holding a total of fourteen and a half million rations including over nine million Compo rations, an average of twelve days wastage at 21 Army Group rates for the main artillery natures of ammunition and nearly 70,000 tons of HT 80.
The considerable stock of POL at this stage gave rise to a certain amount of criticism but subsequent events proved the necessity for such holdings.
With this firm administrative base at their backs the Second Army and First Canadian Army commenced their task of breaking through the hard crust of the GERMAN resistance—a task which ended in hectic pursuit of the enemy in his headlong flight through FRANCE and BELGIUM.
