The Operations WEST of the RHINE
The Operations WEST of the RHINE
In order to concentrate the large number of forces involved in operation VERITABLE a complete programme of road development was undertaken, one hundred miles of new roads being constructed including several by-passes while four hundred miles of existing roads had to be repaired and reconstructed.
Four main maintenance routes were available with three road bridges over the River MAAS at MOOK, GRAVE and RAVENSTEIN.
The capacity each way of these roads was estimated at a total of 7,000 vehicles a day under freezing conditions and 4,800 a day under conditions of thaw.
In order to ensure that formations coming under command of First Canadian Army from Second Army could be moved within the shortest possible time as they became available from operations in the ROER area, it was essential to observe the closest control of movement.
A series of traffic check points was set up, each with telecommunication to HQ First Canadian Army.
Also a joint office was established called “Grouping Control” which co-ordinated the movement between the two armies. .
The programme involved 35,000 vehicles (mainly of 30 Corps) moving approximately eighty miles within a period of nineteen days.
No major delays occurred in the assembly in spite of the fact that sudden thaws caused large stretches of the main forward routes to break up and become impassable, and the concentration was completed as planned by first light on 8 February.
There was great difficulty in accommodating the large number of formations which had to be concentrated in such a small area. Due to the bad weather and considerable snow falls, covered accommodation became more of a necessity than ever before. Widespread floods further increased the difficulties.
Also, a number of GHQ AA troops had to be sited in the area WEST of TURNHOUT to deal with the V1 threat while the opening of the petrol pipehead in the EINDHOVEN area took up accommodation earmarked for a complete armoured brigade.
Consequently, there was a large demand for all types of huts and canvas to supplement the existing accommodation.
HQ 21 Army Group released huts to the limit of available stocks and railed them to ’s HERTOGENBOSCH and MILL.
Exclusive of the RAF requirements, a total of 343 huts of various types was released during this period and more than1,600 160-lb. tents and 3,500 bivouacs were provided for forward troops of 30 Corps for use in the REICHSWALD forest during the operation.
It was eventually found possible to accommodate between 300,000 and 400,000 fully equipped troops in the concentration area without having to evacuate any civilians for the purpose.
In the meantime the build-up of stocks and dumping of ammunition had been continuing. Because of the heavy road movement programme already involved it was essential to move as much as possible by rail.
Fortunately the railways in the army area were well developed and a large number of rail heads were available. The rail heads between the two rivers were reached by way of the railway bridge at RAVENSTEIN which was completed on 4 February.
The tonnages off-loaded at First Canadian Army railheads during February reached the very high figure of 343,838 tons, of which 223,000 tons represented the build-up and required 446 special freight trains, some of which were off-loaded at railheads within three miles of the front line.
The ammunition dumping programme was completed on 4 February, 14,200 tons being dumped at gun positions and 22,700 tons divided between the FMC’s of 2 Canadian and 30 British Corps.
More than 2,500,000 rounds of 25-pr were released by HQ, 21 Army Group for the operation with other natures in proportion. Towards the end of the operation which lasted thirty-two days compared with the estimated thirty, it was possible to commence the stocking of No. 13 Canadian Army Roadhead over the MAAS in the NIJMEGEN area in order to ensure that First Canadian Army was administratively prepared to undertake further advances.
This was carried out both by road and rail as NIJMEGEN was then open as a railhead area.
Space was thus freed on the GRAVE bridges for traffic movement to complete the final stages of the operation and to assist in the build-up for operation PLUNDER.
In order to maintain the Ninth US Army’s operation GRENADE and the subsequent crossing of the RHINE, Com Z considered it essential for their depot areas to be expanded northwards into the HASSELT area.
After discussion with Com Z and Ninth US Army it was agreed that Second Army would relinquish HASSELT, whilst retaining some running rights through it, and the southern portion of No. 8 Roadhead,which entailed some re-organisation of the roadhead ammunition dump.
The Operations across the RHINE
The Operations across the RHINE
Meanwhile Second Army was engaged in the administrative planning for the assault across theRHINE (operation PLUNDER) as well as assisting First Canadian Army in the concentration of the forces, the maintenance of routes and also in the provision of certain additional administrative units required for VERITABLE.
During the later stages of operation VERITABLE the build-up for the assault commenced.As soon as operations permitted.
Second Army No. 10 Roadhead was opened in the area GOCH—WEEZE—KEVELAER—GELDERN—VENLO, between the MAAS and the RHINE, so that when the assault took place maintenance problems would not be complicated by having two rivers between the army and its roadhead. 8, 12 and 30 Corps were based on this No. 10 Roadhead, whilst the CANADIAN formations under command Second Army were maintained for all purposes by First Canadian Army.
21 Army Group had no maintenance responsibility for the BRITISH and US airborne forces in operation VARSITY until the ground forces joined up with the airborne forces. The responsibility forre-supply before that time fell upon First Allied Airborne Army.
After the ground forces made contact Second Army became responsible for the maintenance of BRITISH airborne troops and Ninth US Army for 17 US AB Division, sufficient territory and road space for a service area EAST of the RHINE being allotted to Ninth US Army in the planning.
On 8 March the build-up began in earnest and proceeded at full speed until 23 March. The target stocks for the various commodities to be dumped in No. 10 Roadhead before D day for the operation,which was 24 March, were:
- Ammunition . . . . . . 60,000 tons
- POL . . . . . . . 18,000 tons
- Supplies . . . . . . 5,000 tons
- RE stores . . . . . . 30,000 tons
- Ordnance and miscellaneous stores . . 5,400 tons
The very large ammunition build-up which included an allotment of more than 1,500 rounds per gun of 25-pr ammunition alone, was assisted by corps drawing some of their ammunition direct from the ammunition railhead and dumping it at gun positions and formation dumps.
In addition 30 Corps drew six hundred tons of ammunition a day direct from the advance base.
In spite of these aids the receipts and issues of ammunition handled by No. 10 Army Roadhead ammunition depot amounted to a total of 85,000 tons during the build-up.
A large proportion of the tonnages of all stores had to be moved by road in spite of the limitations imposed by routes and bridges.
There was only one two-way class 40 bridge at GENNEP and three one-way class 40 bridges at LOTTEM, WELL and MOOK in the whole of the army area. Arrangements were therefore made with First Canadian Army and Ninth US Army respectively for running rights over theclass 70 bridges at GRAVE and VENLO.
The bridges at WELL, LOTTEM and GENNEP were reserved for maintenance traffic by day and operational traffic by night.
Three additional GT coys were allotted to Second Army by HQ 21 Army Group and on 23 March the MT lift available to that army, excluding all corps transport and bridging companies but including TCVs, was 10,470 tons.
The control of movement by road necessitated the most careful co-ordination as both road and rail capacities were strictly limited and undue road congestion would have had an immediate effect on rail clearance.
During the three weeksprior to D-day the railways brought an average of 10,000 tons a day to the railheads WEST of the MAAS.
All road movement was controlled by Q(Mov) Second Army and during this time over 70,000 vehicleswere co-ordinated by them.
The closest co-operation between Movements and Provost was essential ifthis volume of traffic was to be satisfactorily handled.
The traffic control companies worked continuously at high pressure controlling the maintenance and build-up traific by day and the operational moves bynight.
They were greatly assisted, however, by the loan of L of C sections for traffic control on the MAAS bridges.
In the week preceding D-day the operational moves by road in the Second Army area totalled over 32,000 wheeled vehicles, 662 tanks and 4,050 tank transporters.
By 23 March not only had the target figures quoted above for No. 10 Army Roadhead been reached but in most cases they had been exceeded. Three corps had been concentrated and the movement of something like 130,000 tons of stores, in addition to the ordinary daily maintenance requirements, into an area of approximately four hundred square miles had been accomplished in sixteen days.
The operations EAST of the RHINE
The operations EAST of the RHINE
After the successful crossing of the RHINE, Second Army commenced the break-out from the bridgehead.
From the administrative point of view this operation was considerably simpler than the break-out from NORMANDY across FRANCE to BELGIUM as there was a well-developed base behind the force and a roadhead was established right up to the RHINE with stocks built up and transport resources allocated well before hand. In view of this it was not necessary to direct operations to the capture and opening of a port such as EMDEN to supplement the L of C.
Convoys of army transport and also pre-loaded transport released to Second Army by HQ 21 Army Group were employed in assisting corps in the establishment of their FMCs EAST of the river.
Between 27 March and 3 April HQ 21 Army Group placed 2,160 tons lift of transport under Second Army command,while 630 tons lift of transport from First Canadian Army and 71/2 platoons made available from 100 AA Bde made it possible further to augment the transport resources of corps.
Stocking of No.12 Army Roadhead in the RHEINE area commenced on 3 April and the first drawing by corps were made on 9 April.
Between the 6th and the 8th of that month HQ 21 Army Group released a further lift of 4,560 tonsof transport as well as two DUKW companies converted to 3-ton companies.
These and all subsequent releases of GT coys by HQ 21 Army Group were effected when required as a result of a pre-planned reorganisation of L of C commitments taking into account the arrival in operation GOLDFLAKE of additional GT coys from ITALY.
In order to make sure that there was no slackening in the speed of theadvance HQ 21 Army Group placed an air composite platoon under command of Second Army capable of receiving and controlling up to 500 tons of air freight a day.
HQ 21 Army Group had expected a daily lift of three hundred tons by air but as previously mentioned this figure was never reached. The averagefor the month of April was 143 tons per day.
At the end of the first Week in April 1 Corps came under command of Second Army and assumed control of the area between the rivers MAAS and RHINE taking over the responsibility for the railheads and depots of No. 10 Army Roadhead.
Until the construction of rail bridges over the RHINE all maintenance traffic was by road but on 16 April the first train arrived in No. 12 Army Roadhead having used the AMERICAN bridge over the River RHINE at WESEL. The stocking of No.14 Army Roadhead in the SULINGEN area was commenced from No. 10 Army Roadhead on 13 April.
There was no rail available to No. 14 Army Roadhead until traffic started running from the railtails in the BOCHOLT area to the railheads in the RHEINE area on 16 April. HQ 21 Army Group therefore made available yet a further 11,280 tons of transport lift.
Excluding basic corps transport, Second Army now had a total lift of 31,080 tons.
The 30 Corps assault on BREMEN gave rise to some anxiety as to whether the heavy ammunition demands could be met. However, the situation was eased by the arrival of 4,600 tons of ammunition pre-loaded on some of the transport provided by HQ 21 Army Group.
The expenditure of ammunition on that operation was not high, however, and this enabled the 12 Corps demands for the projected assaulton HAMBURG to be met in full.
1 Corps had now extended their area of responsibility to include No. 12 Army Roadhead, thus relieving Second Army from having to administer a long L of C.
On 3 May, 8 Corps FMC at LUNEBURG was taken over by Second Army and used as an advanced roadhead until the end of the campaign.
In the meantime First Canadian Army’s operations after VERITABLE were maintained on twoL of C. 1 Cdn Corps’ thrust toward UTRECHT was supported from No. 13 Roadhead in the NIJMEGEN area which was being stocked by rail while 2 Cdn Corps’ operations in the direction of ZUTPHEN, HENGELO and LINGEN were maintained from No. 15 Roadhead except for certain items drawn from NIJMEGEN. This roadhead was opened in the HENGELO-ALMELO area on 18 April and was stocked by road from the railhead at NIJMEGEN.
