Movement problems June-September 1944
Movement Problems
A considerable amount of the work achieved by Q(Mov) HQ 21 Army Group during this phase is contained in this chapter while the work of the Transportation Service is described in a other article
When the army rear boundary was established on 23 July a clearer division of the Movements staff became possible. In addition to the Movements staffs at the various HQ concerned, Movement Control staffs were allocated to army roadheads to act as the equivalent of RTOs in the depot areas and to the RMA where they performed similar functions in the base.
There were also Movement Control staffs in the various beach sub areas, transshipment areas and transit camps. Traffic offices were established at both army roadheads and at HQ L of C.
MOVES or staffs
Towards the end of August it was clear that Rear HQ 21 Army Group would not be able to move for some considerable time and therefore control of the L of C would be very difficult if it became greatly extended. An advanced echelon of Q(Mov) was therefore planned to move to the ROUEN area and at the same time preparations Were made for RTO staffs for forward railheads and for a party for PARIS, should traffic be diverted that way.
The advanced echelon was established in ROUEN on 31 August but during the first week in September it moved to AMIENS with a tentacle at LILLE to help in the handover from the FRENCH to the BELGIAN railway operating authorities.
When 11 L of C Area HQ with its movement staff was brought up to AMIENS this advanced echelon moved on to BRUSSELS.
Thus, in mid-September movement in the area SOUTH of the SEINE was controlled by 12 L of C Area up to the railheads in the area NORTH of the SEINE within FRANCE it was controlled by 11 L of C Area in conjunction with the FRENCH railway officials at AMIENS, while in the area in BELGIUM it was controlled by 21 Army Group Movements staff in BRUSSELS in conjunction with the SNCB.
11 L of C Area was also made responsible for rail movement out of DIEPPE.
Port Executive Committees for LE HAVRE, DIEPPE and the Channel ports were set up before the advance and the necessary naval and sea transport personnel and reconnaissance parties mobilised.
They went forward with the armies to enter each port as soon as possible. These port parties were made available by the fact that, with the reduction in stores import, it was possible to start considering the closing of the beaches and thereby reduce the staffs at ARROMANCHES and CAEN.
One Transport Airfield Detachment RAF moved forward with each army complete with a Movements staff. With the establishment of a transport airfield at AMIENS a chain of transport airfields ran from the RMA to BRUSSELS.
The first MFO Port Depot was established at ARROMANCHES in the beginning of this phase and early in August a MFO depot was opened in the RMA.
On 2 September special MFO detachments were stationed at army and corps HQs and in mid-September the MFO main depot was moved to DIEPPE.
BEACHES AND PORTS
Control of the beach and port areas was re-organised. The PMLO for JUNO now controlled the port of COURSEULLES and the bulk of the beaches while the port commandant at ARROMANCHES controlled MULBERRY B, PORT EN BESSIN, and a portion of the GOLD beaches at the eastern end of MULBERRY.
No development of the beaches took place and work was confined to their maintenance. Enemy activity particularly against the JUNO area continued from long range guns until the capture of LISIEUX by First Canadian Army.
The transshipment areas were re-organised and transportation officers placed in charge of the actual transshipment and handling of labour while RASC officers were responsible for the handling of transport, the whole area being controlled under the port superintendent, by Transportation with Movements assistance.
CAEN
Work on minesweeping began at OUISTREHAM on 21 August but the development of the installations in the port of CAEN had started about a fortnight earlier.It was assumed that CAEN would be a major bulk coal port (up to 1,500 tons a day) and would handle up to 5,000 tons of dry cargo in addition. It soon became clear,however, that this full scale development of CAEN would be unnecessary so personnel and equipment were released for the development of ports further NORTH. The CAEN-OUISTREHAM canal was cleared on 3 September and two colliers began to discharge in CAEN on the same day.
ARROMANCHES
On 30 August the first LSI was berthed at the LST pier at ARROMANCHES and a trial was later successfully carried out to see whether a hospital carrier could berth alongside this pier.
Preparations were immediately made to use this means of casualty evacuation whenever possible.
DIEPPE
The enemy’s plans for demolishing DIEPPE went awry and it was possible to open the port within five days of its capture. The first coasters arrived on 7 September and the daily capacity of the port reached between six and seven thousand tons by the end of the month.
LE HAVRE
As already stated, this was captured on 12 September and almost immediately allotted to the US Army by SHAEF. As had been anticipated, the port was badly demolished and it was never necessary for the BRITISH to use it. The port parties scheduled for LE HAVRE had already been switched to ANTWERP.
OSTEND
This port was captured partly demolished on 9 September but was expected to be open within three weeks, after a certain amount of mine clearance and the removal of a block of sunken shipping at the entrance to its harbour.
As stated in para 6 (a) of this chapter, BOULOGNE and CALAIS were not opened during this phase.
RAILWAYS
Train ferry terminals for rail-fitted LST and “Zeebrugge” and “Twickenham” type ferries were constructed at CHERBOURG by 4 August. The programme for supply of locomotives and wagons had been worked out in advance and the War Office allotted the ferries according to it.
The use of LST for wagon ferrying meant a reduction in the shuttle service and in the facilities available for evacuation.
Evacuation of casualties, however, was now proceeding smoothly by hospital carrier and air and the evacuation of PW was reduced when the decision to use them for labour in the base area was taken.
By 17 August rail lines from CAEN to BAYEUX and CAEN to COURSEULLES were opened after the bridge at CAEN over the River ORNE had been constructed.
By 1 September a single line had been opened from CAEN to ARGENTAN via MEZIDON.
After the capture of BRUSSELS a through rail route from just EAST of ROUEN to the area of BRUSSELS was found nearly intact, although it included a long single line stretch from AMIENS to ARRAS via DOULLENS.
Work was immediately started by the FRENCH, assisted by transportation troops, on a bridge over the SOMME at AMIENS the lack of which was the cause of the break in the double line.
The line from DIEPPE to the main route through AMIENS was ready by 6 September which was the day before the first coaster discharged in that port. It was decided to construct a train ferry terminal for “Zeebrugge” type ferries at DIEPPE in order to avoid having to import locomotives from the area WEST of the SEINE rail break.
A new single line low-level bridge across the SEINE at LE MANOIR was completed by 22 September.
Both FRENCH and BELGIAN railway men were anxious to help in every way possible. The BELGIAN railways were in better condition and their central control in BRUSSELS was in full operation as except for the eastern portion of BELGIUM, the GERMANS were clear of the country.
The stock of locomotives was very meagre, however, and a number of captured locomotives and wagons were inaccessible due to rail cuts. It was agreed that the area SOUTH of the SEINE should be operated by the military owing to the poor condition of the track and signalling apparatus while the area NORTH of the SEINE should be operated by the local railway authorities.
With the increase in length of the BRITISH rail operated L of C the priority hitherto given to the US for imported locos and rail stock had to be reversed as the BRITISH had insufficient locos SOUTH of the SEINE to maintain the L of C from the RMA. A transfer of locomotives from US to BRITISH control was arranged.
STORES
Until the cut in imports was ordered the average discharge of stores of all kinds varied between thirteen thousand and nineteen thousand tons per day, depending on the weather, the availability of coasters and the handling of ferry craft.
On 14 August the millionth ton of stores was landed of which just under one third had been discharged at the artificial port.
Up to this time in view of the urgency for delivery there had been little attempt to record the movement of stores once they had been landed. It was now decided that convoy notes for lorry drivers would be instituted which enabled the turnround of the lorries and the general flow of stores to be checked.
Details of the loads were in broad terms except for pilferable cargoes which in addition to the details on the convoy notes, were on occasions specially guarded.
IWT
As soon as the armies reached BELGIUM there was an immediate request for information on the canal systems. Due to a shortage of staff the reconnaissance of the canals took a considerable time but it was clear that IWT would shortly become a major factor in the clearance of stores and that an increase of both Movements and Transportation staffs would be required for this purpose.
Movements September 1944-January 1945
Movements
GENERAL
The necessity for transferring the supplies and stores vital for the maintenance of the armies and for the establishment of the new advance base in the BRUSSELS—ANTWERP area involved the Movements Staff in many problems of road, rail, air and shipping movement in addition to the new factor of rehabilitating and exploiting the intricate canal systems of BELGIUM, HOLLAND and northern FRANCE.
Naturally, the successful establishment of the new advance base hinged finally on the capture and clearance of the approaches to ANT- WERP. Until such time as that great port became available for shipping the maximum use had to be made of road and rail transport from the RMA and of imports through the hastily repaired Channel ports of DIEPPE, BOULOGNE, CALAIS, LE TREPORT and OSTEND.
From the Movements point of view the L of C to the army roadheads was divided into three main portions, firstly that area lying SOUTH of the SEINE, secondly the area NORTH of the SEINE to the BELGIAN frontier, and finally the area of BELGIUM.
All these came directly under HQ 21 Army Group control with the exception of the army railheads which were under control of the armies. It was clear that problems were bound to arise as a result of the mixed BRITISH and US traffic over the BELGIAN transport system and particularly from the port of ANTWERP. A BELGIAN Movements Committee was therefore established in BRUSSELS to ensure the best use by 21 Army Group, Communications Zone and the BELGIAN Government of all the resources available.
Representatives of “Q” sat on the committee so that priorities could be settled Whenever necessary.
The Movements staff of the SHAEF Missions to BELGIUM and the NETHERLANDS were also of the greatest assistance in co-ordinating military and civil movement and ensuring that facilities were available for the former when required.
Three major operational moves were either planned to take place or occurred during this phase.
The first was to have been the switch of 30 Corps from the MAASTRICHT area to the extreme NORTH near GRAVE and NIJMEGEN.
This was scheduled to take place between 13 and 26 December but was curtailed by the GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES and in its stead 30 Corps was rapidly moved to cover the line of the MEUSE. Although this manoeuvre involved crossing both the BRITISH and the AMERICAN L of C it was successfully achieved.
To counter the same offensive 6 Airborne Division was brought over from UK. The move of the Whole division with skeleton transport took place entirely by sea through OSTEND and CALAIS and was completed in about four days.
The main effect of the GERMAN break-through in the ARDENNES was that the movement programmes for war—like stores for the operations scheduled to begin in early January had to be cancelled and the only trains running forward of the roadheads were those carrying stone and construction materials. In the AMERICAN zone, however, considerable congestion occurred on their rail L of C owing to their inability to continue accepting stores in depots EAST of NAMUR.
This had its effect on the working of ANTWERP where stores began to pile up on the quays as there were no US depots in the area.
In order to cater for the possible loss of their LIEGE depots an area between LILLE and VALENCIENNES was established by the AMERICANS as a service area. This was designed also to relieve the congestion on the railway lines without interfering with the BRITISH L of C from the Channel ports and the RMA.
By the end of October the front in HOLLAND had become more stabilised and with the growing efficiency of the rail communications it was possible to dissolve TRANCO and return to the normal L of C organisation for movement.
It had been decided by SHAEF that ANTWERP should be a joint US and BRITISH port to be developed under BRITISH direction and that it should handle tonnages up to 45,000 tons per day excluding bulk POL.
A special combined US/BRITISH staff was set up under Q(Mov) 21 Army Group to plan the joint operation and clearance of the port in all its aspects. This staff produced complete agreement on these problems the terms of which were defined in a document called “The Charter of ANTWERP”.
At the same time as ANTWERP opened, canal traffic from that port to the depots in the advance base was started. It had been hoped that coal traffic could commence from the LIMBURG mines towards ANTWERP along the ALBERT canal during December but due to various difficulties encountered by both BRITISH and AMERICAN engineers this was not achieved until early in the new year.
Movements and Transportation staffs were provided for the barge traffic. In order that the most economical use of all barges could be made the BELGIAN Government was requested in November to establish an organisation through which demands could be placed and which would be responsible for all military needs being given priority.
A more detailed account of the work on the canal systems will be found elsewhere.
At the beginning of December it was apparent that largely owing to the activities of the black market the distribution system for coal within BELGIUM was breaking down.
Unless essential civil services were maintained and unrest avoided, military plans would have been seriously affected and therefore it became necessary to treat the control of coal movement as a military operation. Guards were placed at collieries and receiving points and strict programming of traffic with military despatching was inaugurated.
A movement control group was specially brought over from UK to assist in the establishment of this organisation. By the end of the phase a considerable improvement in the delivery of coal to the correct destinations became evident.
RAIL
When the armies established roadhead areas, road and rail layout was co-ordinated both with a view to sending forward supplies and the moving forward of stocks when the roadhead was eventually closed. By 21 September a double line was through from the ROUEN area to BRUSSELS and 22 September a single line bridge across the SEINE at LE MANOIR was open.
On 6 October the line was through from the RMA to EINDHOVEN in the Second Army roadhead area. NORTH of ANTWERP and EAST of EINDHOVEN bridges were constructed with the object of keeping railheads as close to the fighting troops as possible. It is interesting to note that some railheads were established within five miles of the forward defended localities.
After 23 October the US armies took over the responsibility for operating all railway traffic WEST of LISIEUX in order to reduce the commitment in the RMA, and contracted to forward traffic from that area in accordance with the BRITISH programmes.
During December the lines EAST from TILBURG and NORTH from EINDHOVEN were extended so that when the bridge at RAVENSTEIN was repaired railheads could rapidly be established between the WAAS and the RHINE.
At the same time the line from TILBURG to GENNEP was developed so that the dumping of stores for operations SOUTH of NIJMEGEN could be accelerated. By mid-December rail communications were through to ’s HERTOGENBOSCH both from WEST and SOUTH and at the end of that month the railway was opened as far as RAVENSTEIN as the railway bridge at ’s HERTOGENBOSCH had been completed.
A considerable amount of personnel traffic, principally drafts, was beginning to flow along the L of C and during October and November a personnel service was organised with appropriate halts and feeding points.
The traffic initially ran from DIEPPE to LOUVAIN but subsequently went from OSTEND up to EINDHOVEN. In addition arrangements were made for civilians to be evacuated in returning store trains and in special trains from localities made uninhabitable by battle or flooding or for reasons of security.
On 1 January with the inauguration of the leave service to UK via CALAIS trains were run from OISTERWIJK for First Canadian Army, from BOURG LEOPOLD for Second Army, and from ROUEN for the L of C.
PORTS
OSTEND
This port was open to traffic from 28 September and was developed initially as a stores and bulk petrol port with the intention that, as ANTWERP came into use, the intake of stores would be slightly reduced and the personnel flow through the port increased so that it would ultimately become the main personnel port for the BRITISH forces.
DIEPPE
The import of stores through DIEPPE ceased on 28 December having averaged over 4,000 tons per day since the port was first opened. A total of 420,000 tons had been discharged.
LE TREPORT
This was opened as a satellite port of DIEPPE on 2 October and used principally for LOT carrying “Queen Marys” with crashed aircraft. The use of this port ceased as soon as BOULOGNE Was developed.
BOULOGNE
With the opening of ANTWERP it became unnecessary to continue discharging large quantities of stores in BOULOGNE and the port was closed to stores import on 13 January. The cross-channel POL pipeline was extended to a pipehead at CALAIS which greatly facilitated the handling of bulk POL trains.
CALAIS
Initially the port was developed for personnel traffic and as a train ferry terminal. The first train ferry was accepted on 21 November. This port later handled all BLA leave personnel.
ANTWERP
The port was opened to coastal shipping on 26 November and to deep draught shipping on 28 November after considerable sweeping of the approaches had been accomplished by the Navy. Tonnages discharged on BRITISH account rose rapidly reaching and average of 8,600 tons per day at the end of December and in January had increased to over 10,500 tons per day. Bulk petrol installations within the port were developed as a joint project and during December 160,000 tons of bulk petrol were discharged. The opening of ANTWERP made it possible to accept shipping direct from the US and from the Middle East.
GHENT
On 19 December the first ship entered GHENT. As it was uncertain whether GHENT was to be used for BRITISH or US traffic a charter similar so that for ANTWERP had been drawn up for dual control. Initially only BRITISH traffic was passed through the port.
MULBERRY
During September and October severe gales damaged the break-Waters and as the opening of ANTWERP for BRITISH and US traffic could now be foreseen, SHAEF agreed that winterisation work should cease at the end of October.
By the end of November it was possible to close the port completely for US and BRITISH traffic, and dismantling of the port preparatory to sheltering portions of it in the CAEN canal was commenced.
ROADS
It was clear that owing to the destruction of the RAVENSTEIN rail bridge, road trans- port would be the main method of supporting administratively the operations South-East from NIJMEGEN across the RHINE. The number of EAST-WEST road routes available EAST of BRUSSELS in the BRITISH zone was very limited and it was expected that under winter traffic conditions they would rapidly break up. Accordingly a route development plan was prepared for the roads essential for maintenance and operational concentration. These routes were to be carried forward as far as possible so that once bridges were established over the MAAS the traffic system could be linked up with the minimum of delay to facilitate the concentration for the crossing of the RHINE.
AIR FREIGHT
On 1 December the permanent transport airfield in BELGIUM was opened at NIVELLES. This airfield was reserved solely for transport aircraft.
During December and early January a steady lift of 400 to 500 tons per week of mixed ordnance stores, mail, newspapers and blood was maintained. The empty freight aircraft were used for the return to UK of compassionate leave cases, personnel drafts, PW and certain units returning to UK for re-equipment.
MFO
On 12 October the main MFO Depot had been moved to BRUSSELS and the port depot was transferred from DIEPPE to OSTEND six days later.
Movements January-May 1945
Movements Aspect
STAFFS
Early in January further increases to the staff of Q(Mov) at HQ 21 Army Group were made to assist the Control Commission planning, although in actual fact these personnel were not absorbed into 21 Army Group until the end of June.
As soon as it became clear that the cessation of hostilities was imminent the equivalent of a further movement control group was brought over from ENGLAND to deal with the increased commitments (including staffs for NORWAY) occasioned by the larger area and the movement of allied prisoners of war and displaced persons.
In order to release BRITISH personnel from the rear areas, two BELGIAN Movement Control Groups were formed on BRITISH WEs, one early in January and the second in the middle of March. These groups worked satisfactorily along side the existing BRITISH area staffs.
By 1 March, the restoration of the BELGIAN civil IWT organisation had advanced sufficiently for it to assume full responsibility for the execution of barge programmes under the direction of Q(Mov).
Certain technical and financial matters remained, however, the responsibility of Tn. This re-organisation enabled considerable economy in manpower to be effected.
For the initial crossings of the RHINE a special organisation was established to control the movement of personnel and vehicles across the river by amphibians and rafts before the bridges were complete. This organisation was modelled on the lines of the beach group without the service elements except for Medical, Provost and REME and was known as the “Bank Control Group”.
Bank control groups were formed on the basis of one per assault corps and controlled all movement forward from the marshalling areas to dispersal areas on the far bank. As soon as bridges were available to take operational and maintenance traffic, which was about seventy-two hours after the beginning of the crossing, bank control groups ceased to function.
The Movement Control Report Centre now re-named the Movement Control Depot remained in BRUSSELS during the whole period until moving into GERMANY at the same time as HQ 21 Army Group in June.
PORTS
The employment of civilian labour to operate the ports was found to be highly successful.
Due to a shortage of manpower certain BELGIAN units were formed so as to release BRITISH units.
In February port operating personnel were sent down to MARSEILLES to assist in the disembarkation of the units engaged in operation GOLDFLAKE.
The best day’s tonnage discharge in the theatre occurred on 25 February, when the discharge at all ports on BRITISH account was 31,000 tons, including 20,000 tons at ANTWERP.
CAEN
During most of this period CAEN was used chiefly for outward shipment of stores from the RMA to ANTWERP and the return of major assemblies and empty ammunition boxes to UK. During the peak period as many as three thousand tons per day were loaded.
CALAIS
The development of CALAIS for personnel traffic proceeded satisfactorily and the leave traffic which had increased to four thousand a day at the beginning of March was again increased to six thousand a day at the beginning of April. The service of LCI(L) which had been operated from DOVER for the conveyance of reinforcements ceased during April, the LCI (L) being diverted to the TILBURY-OSTEND route. Meanwhile LCT traffic which had been going to BOULOGNE was switched to CALAIS at the beginning of May, thus enabling BOULOGNE to be closed for military traffic.
OSTEND
The import of stores steadily declined whilst personnel and vehicle traffic was increased. In April 102,000 personnel including reinforcements and duty personnel arrived in the theatre through this port in addition to six thousand vehicles.
GHENT
The tonnages imported on BRITISH account were reduced during this period and on 22 April the use of the port was discontinued for BRITISH military traffic.
ANTWERP
The port continued to handle all the maintenance traffic of the BRITISH forces, apart from some special items which were imported through CALAIS and OSTEND. Early in April over seventy per cent of the BRITISH stores tonnages were cleared by IWT to the advance base. By the end of April exports from this port began to increase.
RAIL
On 4 February the rail bridge at RAVENSTEIN was completed and traffic was run through almost immediately to railheads around NIJMEGEN. Two deviations were constructed.
One, which was completed by 16 February, ran SOUTH of NIJMEGEN enabling rail traffic to reach MOOK and VIERLINGSBEEK and the other, completed by 20 March was from MOOK to GENNEP which enabled railheads to be opened in the area of GOCH.
Repairs to existing lines were directed principally to the opening up of as many railheads as possible, both EAST and WEST of the MAAS. Al together ten were in operation EAST of the MAAS by the end of March.
With the move of Second Army roadhead to EAST of the MAAS the main flow of traffic for both armies was switched to the more northerly routes and was regulated at ROOSENDAAL.
This action freed the railway network in SOUTH BELGIUM for the clearance of AMERICAN traffic from ANTWERP.
Some idea of the burden on the railways for the build-up of operation PLUNDER during March may be gained from the fact that in the Second Army area, a total of 37 railheads were being used into which 432 trains carrying 230,000 tons of stores were moved, in addition to approximately 60 leave trains.
The GENNEP rail bridge was completed on 1 April thus giving two bridges over the MAAS, the other being at RAVENSTEIN.
It was necessary to repair the rail system EAST of the RHINE in order to operate a railhead and rail tail organisation until a railway bridge across the RHINE could be constructed. The general aim was to develop a rail L of C as far forward as possible in order to economise in transport and enable the armies to advance further and faster. The site for the RHINE bridge in the BRITISH zone was selected at SPYCK and work on the bridge commenced on 7 April.
It was completed by 8 May and two days later the railway line from BELGIUM to the BREMEN area was open.
Trains EAST of the RHINE were initially run by BRITISH troops but were soon handed over to the GERMANS for operating under BRITISH supervision.
By the end of March the flow of BRITISH military traffic over the FRENCH railways had virtually ceased, except from the port of CALAIS and from other installations at LILLE in northern FRANCE. The rail move of GOLDFLAKE from the SOUTH of FRANCE was carried out under the direction of the HQ specially set up in PARIS in conjunction with Com Z.
Trains were run from MARSEILLES to ATH in BELGIUM which was the railhead for the dispersal areas.
The flow of leave and duty personnel after the New Year steadily increased and by the end of April sixteen personnel trains were being run daily.
IWT
The SOUTH BEVELAND canal was opened on 19 February so that when western HOLLAND was liberated barge traffic could pass from ANTWERP into the DUTCH canals.
During the same month the MEUSE-ESCAUT canal was also opened and by the end of March the ZUIDWILLENS VAART and MAAS-WAAL canals were almost in operation.
This meant that the major network in BELGIUM and HOLLAND up to the WAAL was practically clear.
In March the daily average tonnages rose to 47,000 tons per day as compared with 27,000 tons and 34,000 tons in January and February respectively.
During April an average of 55,000 tons per day was carried, excluding bulk petrol, and this figure remained constant for the next three months.
It is interesting to compare the difference in the utilisation of the BELGIAN barge system by the GERMANS and the BRITISH.
During the occupation a total of 6,000 craft averaged 30,000 tons per day as against May1945 when the Allies averaged 48,000 tons per day, both on military and civil account with 3,500 craft.
ROADS
As operation VERITABLE developed the plan to extend routes across the MAAS was implemented.
By the time operation PLUNDER was due to start, eleven one-way routes were open across the MAAS, of which six, including the only class 70 route, were within Canadian Army area, and the remaining five in the Second Army area.
In addition, running rights were obtained over the VENLO bridge, although this was primarily for the use of the AMERICANS.
Two of the bridges at MOOK and GENNEP were built on the existing piers of the old railway bridges.
Crossings over the RHINE were developed initially with rafts and amphibious vehicles, followed by low classification Bailey pontoon bridges, then by class 40 Bailey bridges and ultimately semi-permanent piled bridges.
Four bridges in the XANTEN area and four in the REES area had been erected by about the fourth day after the assault, although some were completed within twenty-four hours of the crossing.
When the break-out from the bridgehead occurred, bridges were built at EMMERICH to supply the CANADIANS and to enable a start to be made on establishing No. 15 Roadhead at ALMELO until a route from ARNHEM could be opened. This route, which proceeded via ZUTPHEN, was opened in the third week in April and made semi-permanent, thus simplifying the movement of stores from the roadhead at NIJMEGEN.
During April when the operational traffic over the RHINE had considerably eased, the number of bridges was reduced so that only the semi-permanent piled bridges at XANTENand REES remained.
The bridges at EMMERICH were lifted at the end of April with the exception of one which was retained for local traffic.
The road-net EAST of the RHINE was more than adequate to carry the necessary traffic. There were, however, bottlenecks over various rivers and canals, but sufficient bridges were constructed to carry three main two-way routes for operational and maintenance traffic as the advance progressed.
AIR
There were no major changes in the air movement organisation of both personnel and freight as the existing airfields were sufficient to cater for all requirements until a major move forward EAST of the RHINE.
As the armies advanced every effort was made to restrict the number of transport airfields to a minimum in order to simplify passenger services and thus reduce the demands made on the Movements staff with the result that only three personnel airfields were in operation EAST of the RHINE by 8 May.
