Support Troops 15 January

The “Q” Background

By the end of the second week in January the GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES had been liquidated.

On 15 January therefore stock piling began for operation VERITABLE which was timed to commence on 8 February.

This operation was to be the first blow of what the C-in-C 21 Army Group in his personal message of 7 February characterised as “the last round”.

In that same message the C-in-C continued by emphasizing that the last round would continue until the final count and that there could be no relaxation until the knock-out blow had been delivered. These were the principles on which the whole of the administration in this phase was based.

Before the assault across the RHINE into inner GERMANY could take place the obstacle of the River MAAS had to be crossed, and the country between the two rivers cleared of the enemy until 21 Army Group could close up all along the RHINE from DUSSELDORF to ARNHEM with its right flank secured by the US armies.

From that moment the time taken for the build-up of the vast quantities of stores and bridging material required for the assault had to be reduced to a minimum in order to allow the enemy no opportunity to recover and regroup behind the protection of that great river obstacle.

Despite the fact that the date for the assault was brought forward by five days from that originally planned the whole build-up was completed the day before the attack.

From the moment that the signal “21 Army Group will now cross the RHINE” was put into effect the weight of the attack and the momentum of the pursuit had to be maintained until final victory.

As in the previous swift advance across FRANCE and BELGIUM the exertion of continual pressure on there treating and broken enemy depended on the necessary supplies and stores being constantly and instantly available to the fighting troops.

This object was achieved until the final count took place on LUNEBURG HEATH on 5 May.

It can be said, perhaps, that the administrative built-up for these operations was the setting in front of which the operational role of the fighting formations was enacted.

But just as no stage can be set without thorough and painstaking preparations behind the scene, so these administrative achievements could not have been brought about had not the work in the advance base and on the Lof C been carefully co-ordinated and directed to the final end of ensuring that the operations continued without pause until final victory.

The various aspects of this ground work peculiar to each service will be found in appropriate service paragraphs but it may be advisable to consider briefly some of the major policies, decisions and circumstances that contributed to the successful support of the armies before examining the administrative plans for the actual operations.

Coal

Apart from the day to day requirements of coal for military domestic use and transport purposes, the productive capacity of factories in the advance base and the fulfilment of the contracts placed locally depended on sufficient coal being available to supply the necessary power.

The loss of the pitwood supplies of the ARDENNES mentioned in the previous phase caused considerable shortage of coal at the beginning of the year.

Arrangements were made with SHAEF to import twenty-five thousand tons of wood and steel pitprops from UK and this amount was brought in through GHENT commencing at the end of January.

It was distributed under HQ 21 Army Group arrangements.

Towards the end of January the coal situation further deteriorated owing to strikes and the freezing of canals.

Second Army drew its requirements of coal by road direct from the mines and was fortunate in having its demands met in full, but First Canadian Army and L of C who had to rely on rail and canal transportation received only half of their January allocation.

A transfer of one thousand tons was made by Second Army to First Canadian Army to mitigate their shortage.

At one time the BRUSSELS power station was reduced to a reserve of only two days and was consuming 150 tons more coal per day than it was receiving.

Drastic measures for effecting economy in consumption of electricity were put in hand by the BELGIAN Government under pressure from HQ 21 Army Group and some saving of coal was thereby effected.

The overthrow of the BELGIAN Government in February and its replacement by a new Cabinet which was largely Socialist in representation, coupled with the personal assumption of responsibility for coal by the new Prime Minister, led to a general resumption of work and the situation began to improve.

In order to combat the losses of coal that were occurring through theft and illegal drawings by civilians, orders were issued that coal would be drawn direct from the mines only on written authority of SHAEF or HQ 21 Army Group and military guards were placed at the principal unloading points.

At the beginning of February it was arranged that the co-ordination of pitwood production for the BELGIAN mines would be the responsibility of the Directorate of Works, 21 Army Group. Although the ARDENNES source of pitwood had been cleared of the enemy considerable mine clearance was necessary before the Wood could again be cut.

The target figure for delivery to the BELGIAN mines from indigenous production was again made 1,400 tons per day until the beginning of May and it was hoped that this, coupled with the imports already planned, would raise the coal output capacity of the BELGIANmines to 50,000 tons per day.

An extra 300 tons of pitwood per day, making a total of 1,700 tons in all,would be provided for the DUTCH mines.

The main sources of supply were the SOUTH ARDENNES,the BOURG LEOPOLD area and a small quantity from the CHARLEROI area for the BELGIAN mines,while the amount required for the DUTCH mines would be obtained from LUXEMBOURG.

It was represented to SHAEF that this last commitment should be an AMERICAN responsibility as LUXEMBOURG was in their zone.

Movement of pitwood to the mines was to be carried out as far as possible by rail and barge when the canals again become open. Two ten-ton GT coys were also employed in moving pitwood by road.

In March negotiations were initiated to relieve 21 Army Group of their responsibility for the provision of pitwood for the BELGIAN mines, in order that the forestry companies and transport units employed on it could be released for work in GERMANY.

On 10 April the BELGIAN Government agreed to release the two transport companies and the forestry companies by 15 May provided that certain clothing and stores were supplied for the forestry units that they were to form in lieu and that four hundred lorries were also handed over to enable the pitwood to be transported to the mines.

After the advance into GERMANY an assessment of coal production estimated that 360,300 tons could be produced from COLOGNE, AACHEN, SAAR and the WEST RUHR district during the month of May.

The stock position of coal at these places totalled 147,000 tons on 1 April.

BRITISH military requirements in GERMANY were estimated at 7,600 tons of coal for May and BRITISH Military Government requirements would be 198,000 tons approximately for the same month.

Forestry companies were moved up into GERMANY and the utmost use made of captured sawmills to increase the production of pitwood.

Theatre Reserves

At the beginning of February a policy to increase the theatre reserve of supplies from twenty-eight" days to fifty-one days was approved and represented to the War Office.

This was desirable for three reasons.

Firstly, now that ANTWERP was open many of the shipments were coming direct from AMERICA necessitating an increased working margin of thirty days as compared with the previous one of fourteen days.
Secondly, as the advance progressed a rapidly increasing demand would arise for the feeding and accommodation of ex-PW, Displaced Persons and PW.
Thirdly, as in the previous autumn,the increased holding of reserves would enable imports to be restricted when an advance occurred and thus release transport from the rear areas to support the momentum of the pursuit.

It was impossible to increase the imports of ammunition in order to augment the reserve as the maximum quantities possible were already being received in the theatre.

In the case of POL the bulk reserves were sufficiently great to cover both US and BRITISH requirements.

At the request of SHAEF 73,000 tons of the reserve MT 80 were earmarked for AMERICAN use and it was not considered necessary to increase the stocks.

At the end of February heads of Services were requested to have instantly ready the minimum figures for necessary imports in each ten day shipping period so that arrangements could be made for an immediate restriction to be applied when the appropriate moment arrived.

Air Freight

Pre-packed supplies representing five days maintenance for a division were held in UK for the supply by air either of airborne troops or, in an emergency, of isolated forward troops.

In January it was decided that two days reserve for an infantry or armoured brigade group should be brought to NIVELLES airfield from these stocks so that unfavourable flying conditions in UK would not necessarily rule out the possibility of supply by air being carried out.

At the end of February a further two days supply for an airborne brigade group was flown in. It was thought that air supply might well be requiredfor the troops taking part in the airborne operation VARSITY but in actual fact it never became necessary as the ground forces in PLUNDER rapidly made contact with the airborne troops and theL of C there after was never out.

During the later stages of operations the carriage of petrol and supplies by air to the forward areas in the advance assumed greater importance due to the extension of the L of C.

Difficulties were encountered in obtaining sufficient aircraft for this purpose as first priority for transport aircraft was allotted by SHAEF to the evacuation and repatriation of allied PW.

Air transport was closely controlled by Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR) at SHAEF.

All demands for air freight had to be submitted to CATOR who then made the allocations of aircraft to fit in with the following day’s arrangements for evacuating our PW.

The bulk of any transport aircraft not required for this evacuation was almost invariably allotted to the AMERICANS to support their thrust into GERMANY.

The fact that the allocation of air supply was combined with the requirements for evacuation of PW meant that from the supply point of view the best use was not made of the available air lift. In addition, on occasion the priorities for supply laid down by the “Q” staff were not taken into account by CATOR in their allocations which caused further waste of the air freight potential.

As a result the demands of 21 Army Group were never fully met and it became necessary to plan without relying on air freight and to accept any granted as a welcome bonus. Insufficient aircraft were allotted to 21 Army Group for the transport of Naval parties, transportation teams etc. to the captured GERMAN ports and Naval establishments and although the movement of these parties had originally been planned to take place by air, eventually road transport from the already strained resources of MT had to be utilised.

Preparation of Statistics

21 Army Group form 100 mentioned in the previous phase was now revised and new 21 Army Group forms 103, 104, 111A and 111B for reporting of vehicles were designed and produced at the end of April in substitution for War Office proformas which had now become out of date.

A statement showing the comparison between actual theatre wastage and the official FFC Wastage Rates was prepared to enable recommendations to be made to War Office that the official rates should berevised. The statement covered War Office controlled stores, “A” and “B” vehicles, artillery andammunition.

At the request of “A” branch the production of the daily “A” sitrep was undertaken by Q(AE) Stats and statements were prepared for A(Demob) showing the percentage of each arm of service in 21 Army Group which would be released by the calling forward of any combination of release groups from1 onwards. ’

Post Hostilities

Meanwhile concurrently with the planning for, and actual support of the operations, preparations and plans were being formulated for the post hostilities occupation of GERMANY. This was entitled operation ECLIPSE.

The bulk of the results of this planning and the measures that were put into effect occurred after the conclusion of hostilities and therefore will not be mentioned here, but certain aspects made themselves felt before the end of the campaign. The first was the evacuation of allied PW (also discussed elswhere), and of DPs.

Every preparation had to be made to provide stocks of food and clothing and other amenities for ex-PW and in order that they could receive them at the earliest opportunity the commodities had to be moved right up into the forward areas thus placing an additional strain on the transport resources.

DPs also had to be accommodated and a high proportion of the accommodation found in GERMANY was diverted to that use.

The administration of DPs was a CA/Mil Gov responsibility but their demands for supplies and transport again had to be provided at the expense of military maintenance.

The control of captured enemy equipment became of greater importance once the armies had entered GERMANY. Apart from the necessity of preventing material dangerous to the Allies from getting into the hands of the enemy adequate control of captured enemy war material represented a large step towards undertaking the major post hostilities task of disarming GERMANY.

To assist the armies in their tasks of finding and reporting stocks of enemy war material a number of War Material Reconnaissance Teamswere formed, which were HQ staffs designed to co-ordinate Service reconnaissances and collate reports to HQ 21 Army Group.

These teams proved most valuable and were instrumental in uncovering and reporting on large stocks of enemy equipment, supplies, accommodation etc. throughout GERMANY.

Finally, it was possible that an operation into NORWAY entitled APOSTLE would have to take place and plans had to be made for the transfer and movement of 52 Infantry Division and many administrative units to that theatre. All preparations were made for this eventuality but after the surrender

it was finally decided by War Office that the units would not be required. Certain administrative units had to be despatched, however, and their removal led to improvised replacements having to be formed.

Abbreviations

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