6 June 1944 - 25 July 1944

Fire protection on land during the assault was provided by six Fire Fighting Companies, each consisting of a HQ and two first Class Fire Brigades. One company was responsible for each of the three beach sub areas, two companies for MULBERRY B, the RMA and No. 2 Army roadhead while the sixth was responsible for the defence of PORT EN BESSIN and the bulk petrol installations.

The plan for sea fire defence provided for one Fire Boat Company of nineteen fire boat sections to operate as follows :— 

• PORT EN BESSIN - three sections
• MULBERRY B - four sections
• GOLD SECTOR - four sections
• JUNO SECTOR - four sections
• SWORD SECTOR - four sections.

This plan was not implemented in full owing to the fact that fire boats were not completed by contractors in time and during the early stages of the campaign there were not more than six army fire boats operating at MULBERRY B, PORT EN BESSIN and off the beaches. The company HQ was located at MULBERRY B.

During the dry weather in June the main problem was the provision of adequate water supply in the vicinity of dumps and depots. This was solved by the use of static tanks and basins among the depots in the RMA and by filling shell holes and bomb craters in No. 2 Army roadhead.

A water pipe line was run from ARROMANCHES harbour to feed static basins in the transshipment area and a similar line from PORT EN BESSIN provided the water necessary for the protection of the petrol storage tanks in that area. In No. 1 Army roadhead it was necessary to depend almost entirely on the water carried in fire tenders.

Control centres for the receipt of fire calls and despatch of AFS units were established at PORT EN BESSIN, BAYEUX, ARROMANCHES, COURSEULLES, OUISTREHAM and DOUVRES-LA-DELIVRANDE.

The total number of fires attended by Army Fire Service during this phase was 109 of which 44 were caused by enemy action : six of these were major fires. During the critical weather period in June sections of MULBERRY B were kept afloat by continual pumping from fire boats which also carried out much salvage work among shipping.

 

 

26 July-26 September

 

During the advance through FRANCE and BELGIUM four fire fighting companies were employed, two each by First Canadian Army and Second Army, and in each case one company was deployed in corps FMCs and the other in army roadheads.

Other companies were moved from the RMA to AMIENS where they could be called forward for re-deployment when necessary. In addition, one FF company was placed under command First Canadian Army for opening the port of DIEPPE so that operation of the port was at no time hindered by the many small fires which occurred.

When HQ 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas moved into ANTWERP and OSTEND respectively, each had one FF coy in close support to deal ‘with the numerous fires started by the enemy before abandoning the towns. In OSTEND the work was hampered by mines and booby traps which inflicted casualties on AFS personnel and by the fact that the enemy had removed the civilian fire-fighting equipment.

The FF coy at ANTWERP, in addition to extinguishing a large number of fires, contributed many hours of pumping in the port area to enable the docks to be repaired and to assist RN port parties in clearing obstructions and salvaging sunken craft.

In order to repair the dock gates more than two million gallons of water were pumped from the KRUISSCHANS SLUIS under continuous mortar and small arms fire, but no casualties were suffered among AFS personnel.

Operation of the ports of CAEN, DIEPPE, ANTWERP and OSTEND proved the desirability of the early appointment of AFS port fire officers to supervise fire precautions, co-ordinate all FF units and to take charge of fire fighting operations.

Many fires occurred due to the tapping by FRENCH civilians of the bulk petrol line which was in operation from PORT EN BESSIN to the SEINE and a system was evolved whereby every case of damage to the pipeline was reported immediately to the nearest AFS station.

During this phase static fire service control centres were established at DIEPPE, AMIENS, ANTWERP and OSTEND.

Due to the rapidity of the advance and the frequent moves of corps FMCs and army roadheads, the problem of water supply was a difficult one and AFS units were called upon to improvise static reserves.

The total number of fires attended by AFS units during this phase was two hundred and fifty of which eight were major fires and twenty-six due to enemy action.

 

 

27 September 1944—14 January 1945

 

During this phase AFS concentrated on providing fire defence for :—

  • NIJMEGEN bridgehead
  • Advance base
  • The port of ANTWERP
  • Corps FMCs and army roadheads
  • Bulk petrol pipelines.

In addition to the four fire fighting companies under command of armies for FMCs and roadheads and one fire fighting company at NIJMEGEN, two companies moved to 8 Base Sub Area, three to 7 Base Sub Area, one to each of 4 and 16 L of C Sub Areas, and one to BRUSSELS.

Static fire service control centres were established at BRUSSELS, GHENT, LOUVAIN, TILBURG, NIJMEGEN and EINDHOVEN in addition to those at ANTWERP and OSTEND. Where possible these centres were established in existing civilian fire stations thus achieving the advantage of having both army and civilian fire brigades connected to military exchanges.

Where PAD control system existed they were connected by direct military line to AFS stations.

When HQ 10 Garrison entered NIJMEGEN on 25 September the city was being heavily bombed and shelled and the DUTCH civilian fire brigade was unable to deal with the numerous fires caused by incendiary raids.

A fire fighting company was therefore moved from FRANCE to NIJMEGEN , arriving 4 October where it dealt with many fires and by its example put new heart into the DUTCH firemen who, with CA assistance, were gradually built into a useful organisation.

All bulk petrol installations whether taken over from existing civilian resources or constructed by military personnel, were carefully surveyed by AFS officers who made recommendations concerning fire defence where they considered them necessary.

Excellent co-operation was shown by RE and RASC in implementing these recommendations.

It was arranged that one or more AFS appliances would attend every incident following the fall of V missiles within an area of military importance, to take part either in fire fighting or in rescue work.

As a result the many small fires caused by the explosions were dealt with in their incipient stages and rescues of trapped victims were effected by skilled personnel. No major fires were caused by enemy V weapons during this phase.

The more stable conditions existing in this period made it possible to provide static water supplies in the military establishments where natural or mains supplies were inadequate. The exception was No. 8 Army Roadhead, where petrol and ammunition dumps were stacked along roadsides to overcome transport difficulties in bad weather.

On 1 January 45 the enemy made his last concerted attempt to dislocate the allied air forces and attacked airfields throughout BELGIUM and HOLLAND causing many fires among aircraft and buildings. At GHENT, BRUSSELS and EINDHOVEN AFS companies were instrumental in fighting the fires and saving large quantities of RAF stores.

The total number of fires attended by AFS units during the period was 559 of which 12 were major fires, 103 being due to enemy action.

 

 

15 January 1945 - 8 May 1945

 

As operations progressed into HOLLAND and GERMANY AFS resources were strained to the limit because military fire defence was still required for installations in BELGIUM and FRANCE. Seventeen fire fighting companies and two fire boat companies provided fire defence for:-

  • Army roadheads
  • Corps FMCS
  • Bridges over the rivers MAAS, RHINE, WESER and ELBE(d) Important centres of communications in army areas
  • ANTWERP, GHENT, OSTEND and CALAIS ports
  • Advance base installations
  • Bulk petrol pipelines
  • Depots and installations in the RMA.

Thirty-one fire boats operated in the ports of CALAIS, OSTEND, GHENT and ANTWERP and in the SCHELDT anchorages off TERNEUZEN. Personnel of these boats were controlled and administered by two HQ fire boat companies AFS each of which had its own workshop section for maintenance and repair. For major repairs, however, return to UK was necessary.

Trailer fire pumps were now beginning to show signs of wear and as spare parts and replacements became increasingly difficult, a pool of twelve new pumps was established in BRUSSELS for issue to AFS companies on loan while awaiting repairs to unit pumps.

In BRUSSELS a garage was requisitioned to which a large amount of captured enemy fire equipment was brought for inspection, test, repair when necessary and issue to units, depots etc. as recommended by AFS fire advisers.

In addition all fire equipment handed in to RSDs in and around BRUSSELS was dealt with similarly by the AFS company stationed in the city.

At the beginning of February a DADAFS and his staff were added to the WE's of HQ First Canadian Army and HQ Second Army, thus ending the ad hoc arrangement where by service control of AFS units under command of armies had been maintained by HQ 21 Army Group. Technical advice was immediately available to armies in planning operations, closer supervision of the deployment of AFS companies was possible and in general the AFS became effectively represented at Army HQ.

The addition of a Staff Capt AFS(Ports) to the WE of a HQ Base Sub Area as port fire officer eased the situation at ANTWERP as the DADAFS 7 Base Sub Area had been supervising the fire prevention arrangements for the port in addition to his other duties. By constant supervision of personnel and inspection of installations the port fire officer was able to acquire a knowledge of daily events within the port which enabled him to keep losses by fire to a minimum. Operation of the port was not interrupted for a single day during the height of its activity in spite of almost continuous attacks by enemy V-weapons.

Between 7 October and 30 March, 4,248 V1s and 1,712 V2s were recorded as falling within 7 Base Sub Area and the central fire service control was put out of action and forced to move three times. V weapons were the cause of 105 fires of which one required thirty-two and another twelve AFS pumps, while the remainder required only five pumps or fewer. HE bombs caused three major fires, one requiring six AFS pumps and the others five each. AFS casualties from V-bombs were one officer and twenty-four ORs injured.

The number of fires attended by AFS units during the period under review was 1,191 of which 22 were major fires and 188 due to enemy action. The most serious of these occured on 19 January when a V2 fell in HOBOKEN BPI, threatening a total of 102,658 tons of spirit.

The fire was extinguished within fifty hours of the first outbreak and resulted in a net loss of only 3,500 tons MT80 and AV gas.

A second V2 fell on HOBOKEN BPI on 14 February causing several fires while on the same day an explosion occurred on board a RN MTB moored at OSTEND and the ensuing fires required 19 AFS pumps and three fire boats for their extinction.

During the advance into GERMANY fires occurred from time to time to which the GERMAN civilian fire brigades were called to assist AFS units. In such cases the GERMAN firemen, as distinct from foreign firemen, showed great willingness and acted without question as directed by the AFS personnel in control of the fire grounds.

Within a few hours after the GERMANS were driven out of ARNHEM by First Canadian Army on 15 April, thirty-six fires broke out in unoccupied buildings in widely separated parts of the town. In spite of careful enquiries and searches of unaffected buildings by AFS, RE and RCE personnel the cause was never determined but has been attributed to some form of delayed action incendiary bomb.

Immediately after the capture of HAMBURG two FF coys were deployed in the town and in the port and Fire Service Controls were established. These precautions were particularly necessary in that city as RAF bombings had caused extensive damage to communications and the civilian fire brigade was composed almost entirely of foreign labour who were under-nourished, untrained and in many cases unwilling to fight fires which had been set deliberately by their liberated countrymen.

The total number of fires attended by AFS units between D-day and VE day was 2,109 of which 48 were major fires and 351 were caused by enemy action.

 

Abbreviations


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